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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
RFJX T. FUHRIMAN, INC.,
Plaintitff and Appellant,
vs.

)
Case No. 10925

.JOHN E. JARRELL,
\
Defendant and Respondent. }
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is a civil action brought by Plaintiff to recover
for rent of a house, with a Counterclaim by the Defendant
for damages for breach of a construction contract between the parties.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Court, sitting without a jury, gave judgment to
the Plaintiff on its Complaint for the rentals and judgment to the Defendant for his Counterclaim for damages
for breach of contract.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks reversal of that part of
the judgment in Defendant's favor for damages for
breach of contract.

2
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff is a building contractor corporation and
the principal constructor of homes in what is known as
the "Golf Course Subdivision" in Logan, Utah, having
built about one-half of the new homes in this area. (Tr.

120)
Defendant desired to build a new home in this area
and engaged Plaintiff to do the job. (Ex. 4 and 5) In
the meantime, Defendant needed a home in which to
reside and entered into a lease arrangement with Plaintiff to occupy one of Plaintiff's completed homes in said
area. (Tr. 6, 8, 51, and 52)

The address of the rental home is 1454 North 16th
East, Logan, Utah. The Complaint involves this home.
The address of the constructed home is 1675 East
14th North, Logan, Utah. The Counterclaim involves
this home.
Defendant occupied the rental home from September 9, 1964 to April 5, 1965 (when the constructed home
was finished) at an agreed rental of $125.00 per month,
a total of seven months less four days, or a total rental
of $858.36. (Tr. 6, 8, 51, 52, and 102)
Following the completion of the constructed home,
Plaintiff submitted a billing to the Defendant, Exhibit
Def. 1, showing rent due on the rented house and the
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balance due on the constructed house, summarizing
both charges and credits.
On May 12, 1965, Defendant sent Plaintiff two
checks:
(a) Exhibit Def. 2 for $138.36 marked "Rent (1454
North 16th East) less interest on house money." (Tr.
~6

and Exhibit Def. 2)
( b) Exhibit Pl. 1, for $3,920.10 marked "In full

payment on my home 1675 East 14th North, Logan,
Utah." err. 82 and Exhibit Pl. 1)
Plaintiff returned the rent check as unacceptable
and accepted and cashed the home check as payment on
the home. Plaintiff made further demand on the rent
due and, receiving no payment, filed suit in City Court.
Defendant originally filed only an Answer and did
not file a Counterclaim until after trial and over Plaintiff's objection in City Court. (R. 5) The Counterclaim
exceeded City Court .iurisdiction and threw the matter
into District Court, where a second trial was had resulting in the .iudgment appealed from.
As to the constructed home, water came into the
basement, some through a cement wall where tie rods
penetrated the wall and some through a window well.
( 'l1r. 62, 128, and 134)
The language of the specifications here

involved~
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EXhibit 5, reads: ''Waterproofing: asphalt emulsion.''
To comply with this, Plaintiff applied a thick asphalt
emulsion about the size of a baseball at each plaoe in the
foundation where a tie rod penetrated through the foundation. (Tr. 63, 124, 125, and 152)
Th~ Court, in its Memotandum Opinion, ruled that

the above phrase menat ''one coat of emulsion to be
sprayed or painted on the 0utside of the walls to the
basement." (R. 11)
When Plaintiff was advised of the leaks in the
basement, the source of the leaks were plugged effectively. ( R. 11, Memorandum Opinion) The Court then
held that, even though the patchwork was effective, the
market value of the dwelling was materially diminished
to the extent of $1200.00, for which amount Defendant
was awarded judgment. (Plus $100.00 for a defect in
linoleum, hereinafter discussed.) The Court, in arriving at the figure $1200.00, determined the record was
void as to evidence on this point of market value but
adopted in this respect a figure given by the one witness
called hy Defendant on this point that to dig up around
the foundation and apply two coats of asphalt emulsion
would cost $1200.00. (Tr. 41 and Ex. 7) Another wit-

hess said $200.00. (Tr. 133)
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECIDING
THAT "WATERPROOFING: ASPHALT EMULSION" MEANS ONE COAT OF EMULSION TO BE
SPRAYED OR PAINTED ON THE OUTSIDE OF
rrHE \VALLS TO THE BASEMENT AND IN MAKlNG A ND Ji~NTERING A FINDING OF FACT, CONCLU8ION OF LAW, AND JUDGMENT THEREON.
rrhe portion of the judgment appealed from hinges
on the lower court's interpretation of the phrase in the
specifications of the building contract between the parties hereto found on page one of Def. Ex. 5, Description
of Materials, xxx 2. Foundations: xxx Waterproofing:
Asphalt Emulsion. The lower court modified this contractual provision by reading into it: "One coat of
emulsion to be sprayed or painted on the outside of the
walls to the basement.'' The extent to which the lower
court read these extra words into the specifications is
aptly illustrated by the exchange between court and
counsel on pages 166 and 167 of the transcript. In this exchange, the Trial Court readily agreed
that he was reading the extra language into the Agreen1ent (Tr. 166, 167)
'Phen, notwithstanding a determination by the Trial
Court that the corrective work by Plaintiff had been
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effective, the Court proceeded to apply a $1200.00 bid
to excavate completely around the house, apply two
coats of asphalt emulsion, backfilling, and repair of a
patio (Exhibit 7) as a diminution of market value of the
dwelling, there being no other evidence in the record of
such change in market value.

It is Plaintiff-Appellant's contention that in adding
words to the written agreement and in fixing the dam-ages in the manner set forth, that the Trial Court committed error.
The Specifications, Exhibit 5, Description of Materials, merely called for "Waterproofing: asphalt emulsion.'' The lower court somehow adopted a fixed theory
in its mind that this consists of coating the entire foundation with an asphalt emulsion. The main question
seems to be now, where did the lower court get this definition of the specification, and was the court justified in
so adopting it ?
This language certainly is ambiguous and does not
in any way define itself. Accordingly, it would seem that
evidence is admissible to determine what is meant by
it. Defendant seemed to rely upon proof of custom in
the trade; but in this respect, he had only one witness,
a Mr. Steffenhagen who is a building contractor, and
testimony concerning certain FHA specifications on
buildings covering the area of dampproofing and waterproofing.
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To dispose of this last item first, it should be pointed
out to this Honorable Court that this house was not an
FHA house, nor was it built under FHA specifications.
(Tr. 137) Second, the FHA specifications call for the
application of one coat of bituminous dampproofing
material to wall from footing to finish grade. (Tr. 156
and 160) This alone is in conflict with the testimony
given h:~ the other witness for the Defendant, whose
testimony was that two coats should be applied. (See
Exhibit 7, upon which the lower court based its arrival
at the amount of damages) Most important is the balance of the FHA specification which provides that foundation dampproofing may be omitted when acceptable
to FHA field office in locations where well-drained soil
exists or where ground or surface will not present a
problem. (Tr. 128 and 160) The testimony in this respect was that the soil in this area was dry and contained no dampness; and that when this area was first
developed as a subdivision, a hole was dug down for a
septic tank test purpose in several areas to approximately 20 feet, and no water table was apparent. (Tr.
121 and 160) Certainly, it would seem that the FHA
specification is not controlling in any respect in this particular instance.
As to proof of custom, the only witness for the Defendant was Mr. Steffenhagen who had been a general
contractor for 12 years. He had built -0nly one or two
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homes (Tr. 44) in this subdivision and testified that
his building practice was to tar all of the surface of the
foundation walls. An interesting sidelight here is that
in rebuttal testimony, Plaintiff brought in proof that
the very home which this witness had just completed
in this area had not, in fact, been so tarred or coated
with asphalt emulsion as the witness had testified he
always did. (Tr. 143, 144, and 155) Thus, it is clear
if the witness did have a practice of coating the entire
surface of the foundation, he did not carry out this
practice in the very area in which we are involved.
Before going on to the law as to proof of custom,
a word or two about the other evidence in this matter
is pertinent. At the time of the trial, there were about
47 new homes in this subdivision (Tr. 120) Of this number, the Plaintiff had built about one half of them (Tr.
120); and the Plaintiff's witness, Mr. Jerry Greaves,
Plaintiff's foreman, testified that he had supervised the
construction on all of these homes. (Tr. 150) His testimony was certain and unequivocal that the best practice in the construction of homes in this area was to not
coat the entire surface with an asphalt emulsion of a
variety that could be applied with a paint brush, but
that a thick asphalt emulsion should be placed over each
of the places where a tie rod had gone through the f oundation to hold the foundation forms in place. There is
no doubt that this was done because the Defendant himself testified that when he made his own investigation.
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he found a coating of this thick substance over each of
the tie areas-the substance being about the size of a
ba!:!eball at these points. Mr. Fuhriman, the President
of the Plaintiff corporation, also testified that in his
building experience this type of waterproofing was the
best suited in this area. Both l\Ir. Fuhriman and Mr.
(heaves testified they were aware of the method of using- a thin coat of asphalt emulsion to be painted over
the eutire foundation, but they had not used this method
for yean; and that they did not recommend this type
of procedure and did not use it themselves because it
'.'.'as not tlw best type of waterproofing and that their
method as described above was the superior.
Thfl specifications are silent on how much asphalt
emulsion should be used and over what areas. The lower
court in concluding that the entire foundation surface
must Le coated with asphalt emulsion must have been
reading into the contract a custom or usage, thus, recognizing the rnle which we are all aware of that usages
anJ customs may and sometimes do affect contractual
rights and liabilities even though they are not mentioned
in the contract. However, we should review some of the
basic and well-known requirements of the application of
this important rule of law
First, the mere existence of a custom or usage by
itself is not sufficient to affect the parties's contractual
rights. While the early view that the custom or usage
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must be an ancient one before it will be recognized has
gone by the wayside, it is still necessary that the custom
or usage must have existed long enough to have become
generally known and to justify the conclusion that the
contract or transaction in question was made or done
in reference to it.
Second, also, the courts have been reluctant to recognize a custom or usage without accompanying evidence that it is general in its operation. It must at least
be shown to be so general and universal in character
that knowledge of it by the parties to be charged may
be presumed.
Third, it must be certain, continuous, and uniform.
Fourth, it must be uniformly acquiesced in by those
whose rights would naturally be effected by it and must
not have been the subject of dispute.
Fifth, it must be reasonable.
It is Plaintiff's position that the testimony of witnesses engaged in the particular trade in question and
familiar with its practices must be available to the
court to establish such a custom. While we feel that one
witness might be enough if his testimony were uncontroverted, we do not feel that the court can base a finding
of custom on the testimony of one contractor when this
testimony is controverted by the testimony of two contractors who have constructed approximately 50 percent
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of the homes in the area involved in the custom. It appears that items second, third, and fourth stated above
are missing in Defendant's case.
Turning to the law on the subject, reference is first
made to American Jurisprudence where the discussion
of Usages and Customs is found under said heading in
\'olume fl5 at Page 263.

Jn particular, the requisites and essential elements,

emphasizing the points mentioned above, are discussed
starting at Page 266 of 55 Am. Jur.
Firnt of all, attention should be called to the fact
that the Defendant has in no way pleaded a general
custom or usage. His pleadings are silent on this point.
Turning to the case law, there is a recent Idaho
cas€' which discusses usages and customs in some detail.
It is Commercial Insurance Company, a corporation,

vs. Hartwell Excavating Company, Inc., a corporation,
(Idaho, 1965) 407 Pacific 2d 312.
At page 314 of this Reporter, the Idaho Supreme
Court discusses the sufficiency of pleadings to set up a
usage or custom in a matter. The court then goes on to
discuss proof of usages and custom, citing and quoting
from the American Jurisprudence provisions above ref erred to found at 55 Am. Jur., Usages and Customll.
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The Idaho Court says ( 407 P2d 314) :
"It is generally recognized that a custom or
usage which may affect the rights of a party to
a contract must be one that has existed for such
length of time as to become generally known and
practiced in the area in question or in ref ere nee
to the particular trade or business with which it
is connected. 55 Arn. Jur., Usages and Customs."
''The foundation for the introduction of
evidence of usage or custom is a showing of a series of acts of a similar character performed at
different times.''
and on page 317 of 407 P2d :
''It is also recognized to be a general rule
that when there is a known usage of a trade or
business, persons carrying on that trade are
deemed to have contracted in reference to the
usage, unless the contrary appears.''
This case is the latest judicial pronouncement in this
area on usages and customs that we have been able to
find, and one of the few in this area on this point.
Also, we note that in the new edition of American
Jurisprudence, Am. Jur. 2d, the subject title has been
reversed and is now covered under Customs and Usages,
and the discussion is found in 21 Am. Jur. 2d, Customs
and Usages, commencing at page 675 of said volume.
In summary, we suggest again that the lower court
in ruling that the specifications call for a one coat application of asphalt emulsion over the entire foundation
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of the Defendant's home, made its determination from
somewhere other than the specifications. In our mind,
it can only come from a mistaken belief that custom or
usage so dictates; and we certainly strongly submit to
this Court that the Defendant failed substantially to
plead or make such proof of custom or usage. We submit
that the evidence is .stronger to the effect that the proper
way and cnstomary way to waterproof in the area involved i.'3 by placing the thicker type substance over the
areas where the ties penetrate throught the concrete
foundatjon, in other words, the critical areas.
In conclusion, on the point of alleged breach of contract, there is no doubt as to the exact language of the
specification - ''Waterproofing: asphalt emulsion.''
Nothing is said, however, about where applied, how applied, or in what thicknes.s. This specification is obviously not a warranty that the home will be waterproof or,
as defendant seems to claim, watertight. Waterproof is
not construed to mean "watertight." See Words and
Phrases, Vol. 44, page 723. There cited is the case of
Waters vs. Yockey, (Texas) 193 S. W. (2d) 575, 576,
where the holding is:
•' rrl1e word waterproof is a relative expression
and doe.s not mean that water is to be kept out of
the basement under all conditions . . . ''
In the instant case, the specifications call for asphalt
emulsion. This was applied in the manner called for
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under the best judgment of the contractor and foreman
based on years of experience in the area. And for the
defendant to say that the fact that water came into the
basement is ipso facto a breach of contract is not correct.
The water came in; the cau.se was remedied, effectively
said the lower court. What more can or need be done?
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN FIXING DAMAGES
AT $1200.00, EVEN ASSUMING A BREACH OF
CONTRACT.
Assuming for argument a breach of contract on the
part of Plaintiff, it remains clear that the court below
erroneously assessed damages to be $1200.00.
Defendant's witness, Steffenhagen, testified that
it would cost $1200.00 to excavate completely around
the house, apply tico coats of asphalt emulsion, backfill,
and repair the patio. (Tr. 41 and Exhibit 7)
The Trial Court adopted thi.s as the amount of diminution in market value of the dwelling, notwithstanding a finding that there was no evidence of diminution
of market value. (:Memorandum Decision, R. 11)
While we agree that cost of repairs may be the
measure of damages, it "vould seem that the costs of repairs would be limited to those repairs necessary to
restore the building to its prior condition, here, to a condition where it did not seep water, 22 Am. Jur. (2d)

15
Damages, Rection 140, Page 204, not the costs of repair far in excess of the need to repair !l!Omething
that does not need repair. Here, the lower court determined the repair work done by plaintiff was effective.
Here, there is obviously no need to excavate completely
around the house, tear up a patio, and apply two coats
of asphalt emulsion. It is strongly urged that there has
l)een a substantial over-play of remedy here, even assuming a breach. In any event, the cost of repair would
not exceed $200.00.
And in passing, we suggest that the lower court
also afforded the defendant a gratuity in awarding him
a judgment for $100.00 on the flaw in the floor covering.
By their own testimony, the Jarrells admitted they were
cutting corners and skimping in order to get more items
for their money than the contract entitled them to. (Tr.
1 I;->)

The credible testimony of the merchant was that
the Jarrells purchased an as-is end role, without warranty; and, actually, plaintiff had nothing to do with
either the selection or installation of the linoleum. Nevertheless, the Court below charged plaintiff with $100.00,
we think, in error.
CONCLUSION
Defendant discovered the leak m the basement
shortly after moving into the home on April 5, 1965.
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(Tr. 61) Yet, on May 12, 1965, Defendant sent Plaintiff
a final payment on the home by a check (PL. Ex. 1) for
$3,920.10, marked, ''In full payment of my home at
1675 East 14th North, Logan, Utah." Plaintiff accepted
this as tendered. This seemed to settle the matter of
the new home, and it was not actually until the day of
the trial in City Court on the issue of rent on the rental
home that Defendant raised the issue of breach of contract. This was on October 5, 1965. (R. 5) Plaintiff respectively submits that it performed the contract involved in a proper manner, remedied the Defendant's complaint when advised of it, and was paid in due course of
time. It should not now be called upon to respond in
unfair and exorbitant damages where none exist.
Respectfully submitted,
OLSON & HOGGAN
By~~~~~~~~~~~~

Charles P. Olson
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
56 West Center
Logan, Utah

